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Here is one for my under 30 years of age readers. I am looking for comments (and enlightenment). I will give my view in a later post. According to an article in the New York Times, a 14 year old girl in New Jersey was arrested for child pornography because she posted a sexually explicit picture of herself on MySpace. In response to the number of criminal charges being brought against minors for “sexting,” several states have passed legislation removing this conduct from felony status. A federal court of appeals recently prevented a Pennsylvania prosecutor from bringing child pornography charges against some 12 and 13 year old girls who took some risqué photos at a slumber party. It seems that teenagers like to take and send photos of themselves in various states of undress. The problem is possessing and distributing these photos is considered child pornography in many states – a felony, with jail time, and the obligation to register as a sex offender. Clearly, the lawmakers did not anticipate this new trend. It also appears that there is a wide range of “sexting” activities from sexually suggestive to explicit.

Essentially, there are three situations which need to be addressed when those under 18 engage in the following activities: (1) posting or sending a sexually explicit photo of yourself to someone under the age of 18, (2) posting or sending a photo of yourself and another person which is sexually explicit, and (3) republishing a sexually explicit photo that someone else sent you privately. Do any of these activities warrant a felony charge? Do any warrant a misdemeanor charge? Should any be addressed in the juvenile justice system? Should any be decriminalized? How should these situations be handled from a legal perspective?

In Advance Magazine Publishers v. Does 1-5, No. 09-10257 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2009) Conde Nast is seeking to identify the people who hacked into their computer system and republished pages from the December 2009 issue of GQ magazine on a blog hosted by Google’s Blogger Service. The complaint alleged a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) for the hacking, and copyright violation for the republishing without permission of copyrighted materials belonging to Conde Nast. The court agreed to issue a subpoena to discover the identity of the hackers and republishers because (1) Conde Nast had alleged sufficient facts to bring an action under both the CFAA and the Copyright Act, (2) the identity of the hackers could be overwritten if not discovered soon, and (3) Conde Nast has no other way of obtaining this information. If you were the Judge, what other conditions would you add before granting a subpoena to identify computer hackers? Would your answer be any different if this was just copyright infringement?

It is South by Southwest® here in Austin this week. While most of the students are away, the town is full of music, films and interactive events. In searching for something with a legal angle that I could write about, I came across a potential legal dispute involving the movie “MacGruber” of SNL fame, which premieres tonight at the Paramount. The dispute stems from a cease and desist letter sent by the attorneys of the creator of the original MacGyver TV series. Apparently, MacGyver is also being made into a movie. The letter did not stop the premier, but raises the issue of copyright infringement.

Essentially, before a suit for infringement can be brought in federal court, the work must be registered at the Copyright Office. The courts will examine whether the alleged infringing work is “substantially similar” to the original work, and if the look and feel, among other things, of the original work was improperly copied. Although it is unlikely that anyone would think that MacGruber was created independently, it was clearly based on the MacGyver character, there is an exception to infringement called “fair use.” One type of fair use is parody. A parody is the copying of a work in a satirical and humorous manner. I don’t think anyone will claim that MacGruber is anything but a copying of MacGyver in a satirical and humorous manner, but not all parodies are automatically fair use.

The most prominent case involving this issue is Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music which was decided by the Supreme Court in 1994. Essentially, 2LiveCrew recorded a parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman,” and like the creator of MacGyver, the owner of the Pretty Woman copyright felt that the parody was an infringement. Although the lower court held that the commercial nature of the 2Live Crew version of the song automatically excluded it from fair use, the Supreme Court ruled that because the work was so transformative (different from the original), the work would not impact the commercial value of the original work as they operated in completely different markets (one of the factors in fair use).

What does this mean for MacGruber? I would predict that a court would find MacGruber to be transformative parody and serving a different market than MacGyver and thus a fair use. I wish them a successful premiere.

Does telling a suspect that “You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions” and “You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview” mean the same thing as “You have the right to an attorney during questioning?”

In the case of Florida v. Powell decided February 23, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court’s holding that the statements made by the police were misleading because they seemed to imply that the suspect only had a right to an attorney prior to the interrogation.  The case of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) requires that a suspect must be clearly warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer present with him during interrogation.

The Supreme Court stated that the exact warning given did satisfy the requirements in Miranda. The Court declined to prescribe any exact phraseology. What are your thoughts? Do you believe the statement “You have the right to use any of the rights at any time you want during this interview” is clear enough to inform a suspect that he or she can have an attorney present during an interrogation? Why or why not?

As most of you know, I usually have a strong opinion on the cases I review. This time, I want to give my readers the opportunity to comment on the future of the Americans with Disabilities Act as it applies to websites. In National Federation of the Blind, et al. v Target Corporation, No. C 06-01802 MHP (N.D. Ca., Sept. 5, 2006), Target was sued because its retail website, Target.com, was not accessible to the blind allegedly in violation of the ADA. Although the organization’s motion for a mandatory injunction to require Target to make their site accessible was denied, the court indicated that the Federation could proceed with its lawsuit. In 2008, Target agreed to settle by paying $6,000,000 to the Federation and agreeing to modify its website with the input of the Federation. Although this case was decided in California and may not set a national precedent, it does seem consistent with the Justice Department’s previous position, although inconsistent with previous court decisions. The questions I am looking for input on are: Are all websites public accommodations? If not, are websites public accommodations if they are integral to a business which serves the public, such as a retailer? What is the cost of making a website accessible? Does making a website accessible reduce its visual appeal? What other issues with websites do people with disabilities encounter? It is my understanding that, in addition to being accessible to those with visual impairments, websites with a “universal design” are more apt to display properly on handheld devices like the iPhone. I am wondering if instead of additional legislation and lawsuits, there is a way to encourage website accessibility in a way that is both cost effective and useful.

In FTC v. Trudeau No. 10-1383 (7th Cir. order Feb. 19, 2010)., Judge Gettleman held Trudeau (a writer and infomercial fixture) in contempt and tried to sentence him to 90 days in jail because . . . wait for it . . . the Judge received emails supporting Trudeau. The Judge held Trudeau in CRIMINAL contempt, which is a serious matter, because Trudeau’s business website posted the Judge’s email address and urged customers to tell the Judge how Trudeau’s weight loss book had improved their lives. (This is the same Judge that entered a $37.6 million dollar fine against Trudeau and barred him from making infomercials for 3 years in 2007. Needless to say, that judgment was thrown out by the Court of Appeals.) Part of the Judge’s rational for criminal instead of civil contempt was that the barrage of emails interfered with his Blackberry. He also felt that Trudeau was trying to get around his order preventing the introduction of additional evidence by having people email their satisfaction with Trudeau’s books to the Judge. I guess positive customer testimonials are a security issue for the Judge. Maybe he was concerned that a bunch of satisfied customers would storm the courthouse looking for more information.

There are a number of interesting issues that the Judge’s actions in this hearing bring up. First, the Judge indicates on record that his email address was private and implies that Trudeau’s ability to obtain it was due to some illicit activity, however, his email address is listed right on the court’s website at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/judge/GETTLEMAN/rwgpage.htm. Second, he goes on about how the problem with the emails was that they did not relate to the Weight Loss Cures book at issue in this case but the Natural Cures book. (Wow – how terrifying – the customers got their books mixed up.) Third, he characterized Trudeau’s actions as “attacking me as I sit here.” (Receiving emails containing positive comments about a book is somehow threatening to the Judge? Maybe if he put his Blackberry away while he was in court, he’d feel safer.) Fourth, the Judge’s office informed Trudeau’s attorney at 4:00 PM the day before the hearing that he needed to be in the Court at 10:00 AM the following morning but refused to tell him why. (This sounds even more juvenile than the previous statements).

At the morning hearing the Judge demanded that Trudeau apologize, retract his request, label it a “mistake,” and that if Trudeau did not show up at 1:00 PM that he would send the Marshalls out to get him. At the 1:00 PM hearing, Trudeau’s attorney, with Trudeau present, informed the Judge that he had Trudeau do everything that the Judge requested at the 10:00 AM hearing. Despite complying with the Judge’s demands, Gettleman requires Trudeau to surrender his passport, post a $50,000 bond, and stay within the court’s jurisdiction. The Judge also repeatedly states throughout both the morning and afternoon hearings that he believes jail time is appropriate. The Judge then seems to try to egg the FTC on to prosecute Trudeau for contempt as well, but the FTC attorney present politely informs the Judge that he does not have the authority to criminally prosecute a contempt proceeding. Despite that, the Judge orders the FTC to file a response. (Does the Judge really think this is the FTC’s role here?) If you want to read the transcript, see http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/trudeaucontempttranscript.pdf.

I am concerned about this type of seemingly retaliatory action by a Judge. It seems to me that the proper course of action would be for Gettleman to recuse himself and allow someone who is less emotionally invested in the case to take over. I will be following this case to see what the Court of Appeals has to say about this criminal contempt order. To read the brief written for the Court of Appeals go to http://media.ktradionetwork.com/media/Brief_and_short_appendix.pdf.

Recently the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Maryland v. Shatzer which created new law. Although the law requires the police to inform those being questioned that they have the right to have an attorney present during questioning, the issue in this case was whether an arrestee’s invocation of the right expires when there is a break in custody. Previous law indicates that police cannot re-question a suspect after they have invoked their right, even after they have spoken with their attorney, unless the suspect approaches them. In the Shatzer case, the suspect invoked his Miranda rights in 2003 after a police officer approached him in jail on another offense. In 2006, a different officer approached him while still in jail and this time he waived his rights.

The lower court in this case had held that because of the “break in custody” between 2003 and 2006, the police were able to re-question the suspect. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed indicating that because the suspect remained in jail, there was no break in custody. The Supreme Court felt that the previous rule applied to “investigative custody” not any other type of custody. What is interesting about this case is that the Court adopted a 14-day rule which means that the police can now wait 14 days before attempting to re-question a witness who is no longer in custody. This is quite different from the previous rule indicating that once invoked, Miranda rights remain intact until the suspect approaches the police.

In what seems to be a disturbing trend, yet another high school student was punished by school officials for comments made on the internet about the school officials. In Doninger v. Niehoff, the 2nd District Court of Appeals held that the school officials were within their rights to discipline a student for comments made on her blog about the school officials by prohibiting her from running for student council in the next election (she was already an officer). The rational was the “disruption” the comments could cause at the school. The comments at issue were (1) calling the school officials “douchebags,” and (2) encouraging students to email the officials to protest the school’s cancelling of an annual event which she worked very hard to organize. This hardly seems like she was attempting to incite a riot or promote criminal activity. What it sounds like to me is ineffective school officials flaunting their authority and striking out at a high school student – for the simple reason that they could. The discipline was not an attempt to prevent a disruption, that was caused when the school officials cancelled the event, the  so-called discipline was simply an act of revenge.

What is most troubling in this case is that the three-judge panel (which incidentally included Sotomayor) actually stated: “vulgar or offensive speech — speech that an adult making a political point might have a constitutional right to employ — may legitimately give rise to disciplinary action by a school.” Clearly, the judges are aware of the First Amendment. Unfortunately, the judges believe that minors who attend public school have no rights under it.  Why would minors be treated any differently than adults in this type of situation? It is the speech, not the speaker that should be the focus of the inquiry.

What is the real lesson here? In this case, what the school officials have taught these students is that the government (school officials and the court system) can arbitrarily ignore the rights granted to individuals in the Constitution and that the best way to handle disagreements is to get revenge. The students here are learning that there is no right of free speech for them. They are learning that there really is a big brother. I’m ashamed of the school officials and disappointed in the judges. This girl should be given an award for caring so much about school events and school government that she was willing to speak out passionately and seek redress for what she viewed as an unfair act by the officials. After what she’s been through, I doubt she’ll believe she can make a difference. (Either that, or she’ll wind up going to law school.) I think the irony that the punishment was to prevent her from participating in school government is lost on the school officials and judges in this case. Maybe they should take a remedial class in Government 101.

In the case of Blockowicz v. Williams, 2009 WL 4929111 (N.D. IL 2009) Blockowicz sued the Williams for defamatory posts that he made on a number of sites, including the Ripoff Report website. Because Williams did not take down the offending material per the court’s order, the plaintiffs filed a motion to get the Ripoff Report to remove the posts. Ripoff Report opposed the motion alleging that the court did not have authority to force a non-party to the lawsuit to comply with an injunction. The court ruled that the only time a non-party can be forced to remove the materials is if such nonparty acted “in concert” with the defendant in the defamation. Because the court determined that the Ripoff Report did not act in concert with the defendant and had a policy indicating that they will not remove any material for any reason, the court would not order the removal by the Ripoff Report of the defamatory material.

This case brings up a curious issue. There are two statues which provide some immunity to the providers of internet services: The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA). The CDA applies to torts, while the DMCA applies to intellectual property. What this case shows is how differently these two statutes treat the issue of immunity. Although the court in Blockowicz did not rely on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, Section 230 states that “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” Assuming that the Ripoff Report is sheltered from liability by Section 230, the question becomes why can you force an ISP to take down infringing materials but not defamatory materials? The DMCA provides that Internet Service Providers can be shielded from liability arising out of copyright infringement if they comply with the procedures set forth in the act and remove the material. So although you may not hold an ISP liable under the DMCA; if you believe you have been infringed upon you can get the ISP to remove infringing material. However, if you are defamed you cannot force the removal of the materials under the CDA. The provider is shielded from liability whether or not they remove the offending material. Interesting.

In the case of Stone v. Paddock Publications, 09 L 5636 (Cook County, IL 2009), an Illinois court issued a subpoena to obtain the identity of an anonymous poster, but then indicated that the poster would be kept anonymous, for a while anyway. This case involves false and offensive postings made to and about a 15 year old boy on the internet. The mother on behalf of the boy filed the suit to obtain the identity of the poster. During arguments, the anonymous poster (hipcheck16) argued through his attorney that his identity should be protected as anonymous political speech under either the Illinois Anti-SLAPP statute or the First Amendment.  

The Illinois court, in citing the case of two Yale law students who were defamed on a website and were able to obtain the identity of the posters – Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 249 (D Conn. 2008) – ruled that the First Amendment does not protect posters’ identities from being discovered when they have engaged in speech which is not protected. The Judge in Stone adopted the 6-part test in Doe: 1. The defendant must be given notice of the subpoena and an opportunity to object, 2. The plaintiff must identify the offending post, 3. The plaintiff must have no other way to discover the identity of the defendant, 4. The subpoenaed information must be necessary to the case, 5. The poster must not have a right to anonymity, and 6. The plaintiff must make an adequate showing that the case has merit.

The Illinois court found that although the first five elements had been met, it could not go so far as to say that the plaintiff had made an adequate showing that the case had merit, because the case against the posted had not yet been filled. The court took the unusual route of obtaining hipcheck16’s identity, but ordering that it not be revealed except to the plaintiff, her attorney, and the process server until such time as the trail court could rule on the sixth element.

There have been an increasing number of lawsuits being brought against anonymous posters of comments on the internet. Although the courts throughout the states have varied widely in their reasoning for issuing or denying subpoenas, this Judge seems to be trying to balance the rights of the poster with the right of the plaintiff to bring an action for defamation. While some critics of these types of rulings have indicated that the plaintiff should not have to prove her case prior to discovering the identity of the defendant, others have argued that it is necessary to protect the right of free speech. Regardless, the First Amendment  does not give anyone the right to defame another.